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Abstract.  Emergent behavior that appears at a given level of organization 
may be characterized as arising from an organizationally lower level in 
such a way that it transcends a mere increase in the behavioral degree of 
complexity.  It is therefore to be distinguished from systems exhibiting 
chaotic behavior, for example, which are deterministic but unpredictable 
because of an exponential dependence on initial conditions.  In emergent 
phenomena, higher-levels of organization are not determined by lower-
levels of organization; or, more colloquially, emergent behavior is often 
said to be “greater than the sum of the parts”.  The concept plays an 
especially important but contentious role in the biological sciences.  This 
essay is intended to demystify at least some aspects of the mystery of 
emergence. 
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 Complex systems, and in particular biological systems, often display what has 
come to be known as emergent behavior.  Associated with this phenomenon is a sense of 
the mysterious: the emergent properties of the collective whole do not in any transparent 
way derive from the underlying rules governing the interaction of the system’s 
components.  Unfortunately, there is not even a universally acknowledged definition of 
emergence.  Nor do the concept and its explication in the literature constitute an 
organized, rigorous theory.  Instead, it is more of a collection of ideas that have in 
common the notion that complex behavior can arise from the underlying simple rules of 
interaction.  There are, however, some very interesting attempts at definition and theory.  
See, for example, Ryan1 and references cited therein, and the book edited by Clayton and 
Davies.2   
 The philosophical literature3 separates emergence into two basic categories: strong 
emergence, where higher-level processes cannot in principle be derived from lower-level 
processes; and weak emergence, where there is no known way to derive higher-level 
processes from lower-level processes, but it has not been shown that this cannot be done.  
It should be noted, as should become clear in what follows, that an acceptance of the 
concept of emergence does not imply that a denial of reductionism must follow.  It does 
however mean we must be careful about what we mean by reductionism. 
 Ernst Mayr4 in his monumental work The Growth of Biological Thought 
characterizes emergence as follows: 
“Systems almost always have the peculiarity that the characteristics of the 
whole cannot (not even in theory) be deduced from the most complete 
knowledge of' the components, taken separately or in other partial 
combinations. This appearance of new characteristics in wholes has been 
designated as emergence. Emergence has often been invoked in attempts 
to explain such difficult phenomena as life, mind, and consciousness. 
Actually, emergence is equally characteristic of inorganic systems. As far 
back as 1868, T. H. Huxley asserted that the peculiar properties of water, 
its ‘aquosity,’ could not be deduced from our understanding of the 
properties of' hydrogen and oxygen. The person, however, who was more 
responsible than anyone else for the recognition of the importance of 
emergence was Lloyd Morgan. There is no question, he said, ‘that at 
various grades of organization, material configurations display new and 
unexpected phenomena and that these include the most striking features of 
  3 
adaptive machinery.’ Such emergence is quite universal and, as Popper 
said, ‘We live in a universe of' emergent novelty’. Emergence is a 
descriptive notion which, particularly in more complex systems, seems to 
resist analysis. Simply to say, as has been [done]†, that emergence is due 
to complexity is, of course, not an explanation. Perhaps the two most 
interesting characteristics of new wholes are (1) that they, in turn, can 
become parts of still higher-level systems, and (2) that wholes can affect 
properties of components at lower levels. The latter phenomenon is 
sometimes referred to as ‘downward causation’. Emergentism is a 
thoroughly materialistic philosophy. Those who deny it, like Rensch, are 
forced to adopt pan-psychic or hylozoic theories of matter.” [references 
deleted] 
 
While the concept of emergent behavior may be difficult to define, it is easy to 
intuitively understand.  One defines a set of rules for the interaction of a class of objects 
with each other and with the environment, and within the constraints set by the rules, the 
resulting observed behavior is often very complex, transcending the simplicity of the 
rules themselves.  A concrete and practical example is the class of artificial insects 
developed at MIT,5, 6 particularly the emergent behavior displayed when central control 
modules are eliminated and the robots are allowed to “learn” their behavior.   
 Randall Beer, Hillel Chiel, and Leon Sterling have done similar work on 
simulating insect-like neural networks on a digital computer at Case Western Reserve 
University.7  The body plan they used is based on the American cockroach and the 
artificial insect they created walks with changes in gait that are an emergent property 
similar to the changes in gait made by real insects as they change their speed.  That is, 
these gait changes are not “wired into” the circuitry.  This complex behavior is achieved 
with only six “neurons” per leg, and two command neurons that are wired to all six legs.  
A six-legged robot duplicating the neural circuitry used in the computer simulation was 
constructed and it displayed a range of gaits similar to those of the simulated insect. 
Deborah Gordon has given another example of emergence8 in her studies of the 
complex behavioral patterns exhibited by ant colonies.  These behaviors, and the changes 
in behavior as the colony grows and ages, seems to be based on the decisions of 
individual ants that operate with a relatively simple set of rules based on social contact 
and the environment within which the individual finds itself.   
                                                
† Original has the word “clone”. 
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The various tasks carried out in an ant colony are accomplished without direction, 
without the chain of command implicit in an hierarchical organization.  A single set of 
rules, at the level of the individual, is responsible for the behavior of the colony as a 
whole.  As an ant colony ages, individual responses are refined to adapt to changes in the 
colony’s environment.  Such refinement represents a type of social learning, with the 
memory trace being stored in a holographic fashion across the individuals of the colony.  
Small modifications of the rules of interaction can lead to significant changes in the 
behavior of the colony as a whole.  Of course this discussion is oversimplified in that real 
ant colonies are far more complex and the inhabitants of ant colonies have specialties so 
that there may be several subsets of rules rather than a single overarching set.  There exist 
many other examples of emergence. 
 The emergent behavior of a system, while it is determined by the elements of the 
system and the rules of interaction between them—and perhaps with the environment, is 
not contained explicitly in any of the rules or elements themselves, nor is the behavior 
explained by a simple summation over the components making up the system.  Emergent 
behavior is characterized by being “greater than the sum of the parts.” 
 While emergent behavior is completely dependent on the set of rules governing 
the interaction between the elements of a system, a key question is whether, at the level 
of the emergent behavior, new rules of interaction appear that are not, in a fundamental 
sense, predictable.  Very simple mathematical models can exhibit extremely complex 
dynamics even though the behavior is completely deterministic.  They have been 
successfully used to model the dynamics of systems in a variety of fields, including 
electronics, mechanics, and biology.9  In each of these diverse areas, even when the 
behavior is chaotic (where the dynamics depends exponentially on changes in initial 
conditions), and the dynamical trajectories may look like random noise, the behavior is 
deterministic.  In terms of emergence, one might characterize such chaotic, deterministic 
behavior as perhaps fitting into the category of weak emergence. 
 Mathematics can also provide examples of truly emergent properties.  A Möbius 
strip, for example, is a one-sided non-orientable surface with one edge.  The one-
sidedness of a Möbius strip only exists if it is not cut.  If it is, the strip becomes two 
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sided.  One might say that the one-sidedness is an emergent global property of the 
complete Möbius strip. 
 The higher up one goes in a given hierarchy of emergent behavior, the more the 
organization seems completely independent of the rules determining the behavior of the 
levels below—which, nevertheless, is not to deny that the higher-order rules are in some 
sense inherently determined by the properties of the component parts.†  But it is the 
definition of “inherently determined” that contains the essence of the problem. 
 How can one resolve this conundrum?  The answer may lie in the new, internal 
degrees of freedom that appear as one ascends a hierarchy of emergence.  Consider first a 
simple example from elementary classical mechanics that has relevance to the formation 
of molecules and hence also to biology.  The number of positional degrees of freedom for 
2N particles is given by the product of the number of particles and the number of 
coordinates needed to specify the location of each of the particles in 3-dimensional space.  
This is 2N × 3 = 6N.  Now if the particles are combined so as to produce N bonded pairs, 
with some bonding distance associated with each pair, the number of external degrees of 
freedom for the pairs is reduced to 3N.  However, new degrees of freedom internal to 
each of the pairs have appeared—the distance between the particles constituting each 
pair, and the two angles needed to specify the orientation of each pair in 3-dimensional 
space, a total of three internal degrees of freedom.  Notice that the total number of 
degrees of freedom (3N to locate the pairs in 3-space and 3N “emergent”, internal 
degrees of freedom) has remained constant. 
 If we had started with 3N particles having 9N degrees of freedom and combined 
them to form N linear chain triplets, the original number of degrees of freedom would be 
reduced to 3N but the emergent internal degrees of freedom would add up to 6N so that 
the sum remains 9N.  For a linear chain configuration, the internal degrees of freedom are 
the two distances between the particles constituting each triplet, the two angles needed to 
orient the line between the first and second particle, and the two angles needed to orient 
the line from the second to third particles, a total of six for each triplet.  For all the 
triplets, the total number of internal degrees of freedom would then be 6N.  Adding the 
3N degrees of freedom needed to locate the N triplets in 3-space gives a grand total of 
                                                
† Mayr’s discussion of “Explanatory Reductionism”  is relevant here. 
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9N.  If the configuration of the triplets is changed to a triangular configuration, the 
definition of the internal degrees of freedom will also change: for each triplet the internal 
degrees of freedom would be the three distances between the particles comprising each 
triplet and the three angles needed to orient the triangular configuration in 3-space (two 
angles to orient the normal to the configuration and one angle for rotation about the 
normal). 
 The concept of degrees of freedom comes from classical mechanics where the 
number of degrees of freedom may be reduced because of the existence of constraints.  If 
a system with n degrees of freedom having coordinates q1, q2, …qn is subject to k 
constraint equations having the form fr(q1, q2, … qn) = 0, r = 1, 2, … k, these equations 
can be solved for k of the coordinates in term of the remaining n–k.  The resulting n–k 
coordinates may be varied independently without violating the constraints.  The system 
thus has n–k degrees of freedom and q1, q2, …qn−k may be taken as generalized 
coordinates, the constraints having been eliminated.  An example might be helpful. 
 Consider a single particle free to move in 3-dimensional space and thus having 
three degrees of freedom.  Now constrain the particle to move on a surface given by 
f(x,y,z) = 0.  This is the constraint equation, and it can be solved for z in terms of x and y, 
which become the generalized coordinates.  The constrained particle now only has two 
degrees of freedom.  The extra degree of freedom, unlike the composite particle examples 
given above, is eliminated by the constraint equation.  Constraints could, of course, also 
exist for a composite particle in which case some of the internal degrees of freedom could 
be eliminated using the same procedure given above. 
 The conservation of the number of degrees of freedom is subtler in quantum 
mechanics.  Take, for example, the case of the helium atom.  A helium atom is comprised 
of a nucleus (considered as a single particle) and two electrons.  As separate particles, 
assumed to be localized in space, the number of degrees of freedom for the three particles 
is nine.  The combination of the three particles to form a helium atom would lead to three 
degrees of freedom for the location of the nucleus and six additional degrees of freedom 
consisting of the quantum numbers n, l, and m for each of the electrons. Of course, this is 
not the whole story since quantum mechanics sets additional constraints on the numerical 
values of the quantum numbers n, l and m. 
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What one may call emergent behavior already appears even at the lowest level of 
reductionist exploration achieved to date.  Ordinary matter derives its mass from the 
kinetic and potential energy of the massless gluons and nearly massless quarks that make 
up protons, neutrons, and therefore all atomic nuclei.  The theory (which can be viewed 
as a set of rules) governing their behavior is called quantum chromodynamics or QCD.   
Unlike many other theories, QCD has no adjustable parameters other than its overall 
coupling strength.  Nonetheless, it has not proved possible to describe nuclei in terms of 
their fundamental quark and gluon constituents.  Instead, so-called “effective” models of 
nuclei have been developed: in high-energy physics, nuclei are treated as a collection of 
free quarks; in the low-energy regime, on the other hand, one uses the many-body and 
shell models.   
 As one lowers the energy scale to the point where the interaction between distinct 
protons and neutrons becomes important, new internal degrees of freedom appear that are 
not contained in the higher energy theory.  One might well view the properties of the 
low-energy regime as being emergent. Although it is still not clear whether one should 
consider this a case of weak or strong emergence. 
 Similarly, the structure and variety of all atoms are determined by the rules of 
quantum mechanics.  But the form of the lattice they or their compounds form may 
depend on emergent degrees of freedom such as temperature and pressure reflecting 
environmental factors.  Although one might argue the varieties of structural forms 
depending on such environmental factors are emergent, it is also possible to argue—at 
least in principle—that the underlying quantum mechanical rules could take them into 
account. 
 An example where this is not possible is the chemistry of saturated hydrocarbons.  
The rules of quantum mechanics certainly determine the bonding of carbon and 
hydrogen, and no matter how structurally complex the hydrocarbon, these rules are 
faithfully obeyed.  But the rules of quantum mechanics say nothing about how many 
carbon atoms may form a chain or whether they form straight chains or branched-chain 
carbon skeletons.  There are emergent degrees of freedom that appear when atoms 
combine to form these hydrocarbon molecules.  It is these emergent degrees of freedom 
that determine the chemical properties of the saturated hydrocarbons and these chemical 
  8 
properties could well be viewed as an emergent property of a complex system (saturated 
hydrocarbon molecules) not fully determined by the underlying quantum mechanical 
rules governing the bonding of hydrogen and carbon atoms. 
 The emergent rules that govern the chemistry of saturated hydrocarbons are 
dependent on the underlying rules governing the bonding of hydrogen and carbon, but are 
not determined by these rules.  That is, the emergent rules cannot be derived from the 
underlying quantum mechanical rules governing hydrogen-carbon bonding.  The 
difference here is similar to that found in mathematics between necessity and sufficiency.  
It is this distinction that should be used to inform the definition of reductionism, 
particularly in biology with its hierarchical organization, in light of the reality of 
emergent phenomena.   
 In the same way, the rules of chemical bonding (again reflecting the rules of 
quantum mechanics) specify the structure of DNA, but not the sequence of bases.  The 
possible sequences of bases and length of the DNA molecule itself again constitute 
emergent degrees of freedom not specified by the rules of chemical bonding.  The 
sequence of bases determines the genes coding for proteins, small RNAs, etc., and it is 
roughly at this level that the environment begins to play a significant role in the evolution 
of life through the Darwinian process of variation and selection.† But it is not only the set 
of genes that is responsible for the diversity of animal forms.  Of primary importance are 
differences in gene regulation during ontogeny.10   
The sequence of bases in DNA contains regulatory code that governs gene 
expression both in time and location.  While this code constitutes another higher-level set 
of rules, they are rules that have the additional property of being able to change with time 
in response to environmental selection at the organismal level.  The emergent number of 
degrees of freedom appearing at this level vastly exceeds those at lower hierarchic levels. 
The whole issue of epigenetics—defined as heritable changes in gene expression not due 
to changes in base sequence, essentially what allows cells having the same genetic 
inheritance to make up the variety of cell types comprising an organism—and its role in 
evolution is still an active area of research.11, 12  
                                                
† In terms of the origin of life, molecular evolution and the earliest living creatures were of course 
also subject to Darwinian variation and selection. 
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At an even higher level, while DNA surely determines the structure of living 
creatures, it would be impossible to derive their social behavior and organization from 
only the sequence of bases in DNA. 
The hierarchy above, starting from the lowest reductionist level now known has 
led to the rules governing ontogeny.  Indeed, from an Olympian point of view, life itself 
may be viewed as an emergent property of matter.  But the hierarchy does not apparently 
end and may well be truly open in the sense of Köestler.13 
 Consciousness and intelligence appear to emerge gradually as the complexity of 
life increases.  Simultaneously, and as a parallel development, a social structure comes 
into existence.  Social behavior can be as simple as that of slime molds when forming a 
fruiting body, be relatively complex as in the behavior of an ant colony, or be represented 
by the far more complex behavior of human societies.  All appear as forms of emergent 
behavior. 
 If the idea that emergent behavior results from the coming into being of new, 
internal degrees of freedom that arise as one ascends a given hierarchy of emergence is to 
hold, the inverse should also be true in the sense that a reductionist analysis should 
eliminate degrees of freedom in the process of descending the hierarchy through 
reductionist analysis.  Here, reductionism is defined as gaining an understanding of a 
complex system through detailed analysis of the components of the system and their 
interactions.  From the examples of emergence given above, this would seem to be almost 
trivially true.   
In sum, one should view emergence and reductionism as opposite sides of the 
same coin.  Dissecting complex behavior from the top down eliminates internal degrees 
of freedom in the course of analysis, while emergent phenomena occur when internal 
degrees of freedom appear when combining component elements into more complex 
systems.  If individual ants are studied to determine their rules of interaction, there is 
nothing mysterious about the process.  But given those rules, one cannot predict the 
behavior of the colony because the new degrees of freedom that appear in the collective 
colony cannot be deduced from the rules of interaction—these rules are necessary but not 
sufficient to predict the emergent behavior.  It is the unexpected consequences of the 
additional degrees of freedom that appear mysterious.   
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